本校學位論文庫
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孙晓蓉
吳澤福
金融學院
金融學碩士學位課程(中文學制)
碩士
2023
存款保險制度對不同經濟水準的地方性銀行風險承擔水準的影響 : 以廣東省和山西省為例
The Impact of Deposit Insurance on Local Bank Risk in Regions of Varying Economic Levels : A Case Study of Guangdong and Shanxi Provinces
顯性存款保險制度 ; 金融穩定 ; 經濟水準 ; 地方性銀行 ; 風險承擔水準
Explicit deposit ; insurance system ; financial stability ; economic level ; local banks ; risk-taking level
隨著金融體系的不斷發展和變革，顯性存款保險制度作為金融風險管理的重要手段逐漸引起了廣泛關注。我國在2015年頒佈了顯性存款保險制度，該制度的的頒佈對於中國金融體系的穩健發展和金融市場的規範化具有重要意義，有助於維護金融穩定、保護投資者利益、促進金融市場健康發展。然而，現有的研究大多聚焦於國家層面或大型銀行，在探討顯性存款保險制度對地方性銀行的影響時研究較少。
本研究旨在探討顯性存款保險制度對不同經濟水準地區的地方性銀行風險承擔水準的影響。通過以廣東省和山西省為例進行經濟水準比較分析，並分別採用定量分析和比較研究方法，考察了兩省地方性銀行在顯性存款保險制度下的風險承擔情況。研究發現，顯性存款保險制度減輕了地方性銀行的風險承擔水準，起到金融體系的穩定性，但不同經濟水準地區的影響程度存在差異，即顯性存款保險制度降低山西省地方性銀行風險承擔水準比廣東省地方性銀行更大，存款保險制度會使得山西省地方性銀行體系更穩定。這一研究結果對於完善銀行監管政策和風險管理具有一定的啟示意義。
本研究旨在探討顯性存款保險制度對不同經濟水準地區的地方性銀行風險承擔水準的影響。通過以廣東省和山西省為例進行經濟水準比較分析，並分別採用定量分析和比較研究方法，考察了兩省地方性銀行在顯性存款保險制度下的風險承擔情況。研究發現，顯性存款保險制度減輕了地方性銀行的風險承擔水準，起到金融體系的穩定性，但不同經濟水準地區的影響程度存在差異，即顯性存款保險制度降低山西省地方性銀行風險承擔水準比廣東省地方性銀行更大，存款保險制度會使得山西省地方性銀行體系更穩定。這一研究結果對於完善銀行監管政策和風險管理具有一定的啟示意義。
As the financial system continues to evolve and undergo changes, the explicit deposit insurance system has garnered widespread attention as a crucial tool for managing financial risks. In 2015, China introduced the explicit deposit insurance system, which holds significant implications for the robust development of the Chinese financial system and the regulation of financial markets. It aids in upholding financial stability, safeguarding investors' interests, and fostering the sound growth of financial markets. However, existing studies have predominantly focused on the national level or large-scale banks, leaving limited research on how the explicit deposit insurance system affects local banks.
This study aims to investigate the impact of the explicit deposit insurance system on the risk-taking behavior of local banks in regions with varying economic levels. By conducting an economic comparison analysis using Guangdong Province and Shanxi Province as case studies and employing quantitative analysis and comparative research methods, the study delves into the risk-taking patterns of local banks in these two provinces under the explicit deposit insurance system. The findings reveal that the explicit deposit insurance system reduces the risk-taking behavior of local banks, contributing to the stability of the financial system. However, the extent of this impact varies across regions with different economic levels. Specifically, the explicit deposit insurance system has a more pronounced effect in reducing the risk-taking behavior of local banks in Shanxi Province compared to those in Guangdong Province, thereby enhancing the stability of the banking system in Shanxi Province. These results offer valuable insights for refining bank regulatory policies and enhancing risk management practices.
This study aims to investigate the impact of the explicit deposit insurance system on the risk-taking behavior of local banks in regions with varying economic levels. By conducting an economic comparison analysis using Guangdong Province and Shanxi Province as case studies and employing quantitative analysis and comparative research methods, the study delves into the risk-taking patterns of local banks in these two provinces under the explicit deposit insurance system. The findings reveal that the explicit deposit insurance system reduces the risk-taking behavior of local banks, contributing to the stability of the financial system. However, the extent of this impact varies across regions with different economic levels. Specifically, the explicit deposit insurance system has a more pronounced effect in reducing the risk-taking behavior of local banks in Shanxi Province compared to those in Guangdong Province, thereby enhancing the stability of the banking system in Shanxi Province. These results offer valuable insights for refining bank regulatory policies and enhancing risk management practices.
2024
中文
85
致 謝 I
摘 要 II
Abstract III
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 選題背景及意義 1
1.1.1 選題背景 1
1.1.2 研究意義（理論、現實） 2
1.2 研究現狀分析 3
1.2.1 國外相關研究 3
1.2.2 國內相關研究 8
1.2.3 國內外文獻評述 10
1.3 研究目標、省份及內容 11
1.3.1 研究目標 11
1.3.2 研究省份 12
1.3.3 研究內容 13
1.3.3 流程圖 14
1.3.4 研究方法 15
第二章 相關理論基礎 16
2.1 銀行風險承擔 16
2.2 顯性存款保險制度 16
2.3 與銀行及存款保險相關理論 17
2.3.1 擠兌 17
2.3.2 道德風險 17
2.3.3 逆向選擇 18
2.3.4 制度變遷 18
2.4 評估度量銀行風險指標 18
2.4.1 Z-Score 18
第三章 廣東省和山西省地區經濟分析 19
3.1 廣東省地區經濟分析 19
3.1.1 生產總值分析 19
3.1.2 產業結構分析 20
3.1.3 進出口分析 23
3.1.4 民營經濟分析 25
3.1.5 外商投資分析 25
3.1.6 人口及人均收入分析 27
3.1.7 金融機構分析 30
3.2 山西省地區經濟分析 32
3.2.1 生產總值分析 32
3.2.2 產業結構分析 34
3.2.3 進出口分析 36
3.2.4 民營經濟分析 38
3.2.5 外商投資分析 38
3.2.6 人口及人均收入分析 40
3.2.7 金融機構分析 44
第四章 顯性存款保險制度對地方性銀行風險承擔的政策效應檢驗 47
4.1 資料與變數選取及模型設計 47
4.1.1 資料選取 47
4.1.2 變數選取 48
4.1.3 模型设计 51
4.2 顯性存款保險制度對廣東省地方性銀行風險承擔水準的實證研究 52
4.2.1 平行趨勢檢驗 53
4.2.2 描述性統計 54
4.2.3 基於回歸因果分析 55
4.2.4 多重共線性檢驗 56
4.2.5 雙重差分模型 57
4.2.6 穩健性檢驗 59
4.3 顯性存款保險制度對山西省地方性銀行風險承擔水準的實證研究 62
4.3.1 平行趨勢檢驗 63
4.3.2 描述性統計 64
4.3.3 基於回歸的因果分析 65
4.3.4 多重共線性檢驗 66
4.3.5 雙重差分模型 67
4.3.6 穩健性檢驗 69
第五章 對比總結與建議 73
5.1 對比總結 73
5.2 建議 74
參考文獻 77
作者簡歷 85
摘 要 II
Abstract III
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 選題背景及意義 1
1.1.1 選題背景 1
1.1.2 研究意義（理論、現實） 2
1.2 研究現狀分析 3
1.2.1 國外相關研究 3
1.2.2 國內相關研究 8
1.2.3 國內外文獻評述 10
1.3 研究目標、省份及內容 11
1.3.1 研究目標 11
1.3.2 研究省份 12
1.3.3 研究內容 13
1.3.3 流程圖 14
1.3.4 研究方法 15
第二章 相關理論基礎 16
2.1 銀行風險承擔 16
2.2 顯性存款保險制度 16
2.3 與銀行及存款保險相關理論 17
2.3.1 擠兌 17
2.3.2 道德風險 17
2.3.3 逆向選擇 18
2.3.4 制度變遷 18
2.4 評估度量銀行風險指標 18
2.4.1 Z-Score 18
第三章 廣東省和山西省地區經濟分析 19
3.1 廣東省地區經濟分析 19
3.1.1 生產總值分析 19
3.1.2 產業結構分析 20
3.1.3 進出口分析 23
3.1.4 民營經濟分析 25
3.1.5 外商投資分析 25
3.1.6 人口及人均收入分析 27
3.1.7 金融機構分析 30
3.2 山西省地區經濟分析 32
3.2.1 生產總值分析 32
3.2.2 產業結構分析 34
3.2.3 進出口分析 36
3.2.4 民營經濟分析 38
3.2.5 外商投資分析 38
3.2.6 人口及人均收入分析 40
3.2.7 金融機構分析 44
第四章 顯性存款保險制度對地方性銀行風險承擔的政策效應檢驗 47
4.1 資料與變數選取及模型設計 47
4.1.1 資料選取 47
4.1.2 變數選取 48
4.1.3 模型设计 51
4.2 顯性存款保險制度對廣東省地方性銀行風險承擔水準的實證研究 52
4.2.1 平行趨勢檢驗 53
4.2.2 描述性統計 54
4.2.3 基於回歸因果分析 55
4.2.4 多重共線性檢驗 56
4.2.5 雙重差分模型 57
4.2.6 穩健性檢驗 59
4.3 顯性存款保險制度對山西省地方性銀行風險承擔水準的實證研究 62
4.3.1 平行趨勢檢驗 63
4.3.2 描述性統計 64
4.3.3 基於回歸的因果分析 65
4.3.4 多重共線性檢驗 66
4.3.5 雙重差分模型 67
4.3.6 穩健性檢驗 69
第五章 對比總結與建議 73
5.1 對比總結 73
5.2 建議 74
參考文獻 77
作者簡歷 85
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